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Swiss Watch Industry 2026: Swatch Grows, Richemont Slips
Two of Switzerland’s largest watch manufacturers released 2026 financial results, and the story they tell is clearer than it’s been in years: the Swiss watch industry is splitting. The accessible market is resilient. The ultra-luxury market is printing money. The middle — where most real watchmakers actually live — is increasingly fragile.
Swatch Group: Where the Growth Is
Swatch Group owns more watch brands than most people realize: Omega, Longines, Tissot, Certina, Mido, Hamilton, Blancpain, and Breguet. It’s a portfolio that spans from entry-level (<CHF 200 quartz dress watches) to ultra-luxury (Blancpain divers at CHF 5,000+). The group’s first-half 2026 results showed sales growth of +8.5% at constant exchange rates, with Q2 accelerating to +9.4%. This isn’t explosive growth, but it’s growth in a year when most of the industry struggled.
The interesting detail: watches in the CHF 500 to CHF 3,000 range — the Mido and Tissot territory, the segment that actually represents real consumer demand — recorded export growth of around 16% in a notably tough month. Swatch Group’s strategy of having multiple brands at every price point is paying off. A Longines Hydroconquest is accessible Swiss watchmaking done right: good finishing, reliable movement, solid case quality. It’s the kind of watch that doesn’t spark investment conversation, but it works, and it survives.
The group’s efficiency gains matter too. Swatch has spent years rationalizing manufacturing and retail. Fewer, better boutiques. Better online direct-to-consumer. Manufacturing consolidation. These moves reduce margin, but they keep brands relevant and accessible. In a market where luxury conglomerates are increasingly closing boutiques and focusing on “selectivity,” Swatch’s willingness to be accessible is becoming a competitive advantage.
Richemont: The Cartier Company
Richemont owns an elite roster: Vacheron Constantin, Jaeger-LeCoultre, Panerai, A. Lange & Söhne, IWC, Piaget, and Roger Dubuis. These are specialist watchmakers in the best sense — houses with serious horological heritage and uncompromising finishing standards. They’re also increasingly irrelevant to Richemont’s financials.
The Specialist Watchmakers division posted sales declines of 7–11%, depending on the reporting period. Currency headwinds (a strong Swiss franc eating into dollar-denominated sales) and a massive exposure to China (a market in crisis) were the primary culprits. A. Lange & Söhne, for instance, derives 40%+ of sales from greater China. When the Chinese consumer stops buying €10,000 dress watches, numbers tumble.
The real story: Cartier and Van Cleef & Arpels carried Richemont to profitability. These jewelry brands posted double-digit growth for three consecutive quarters (~11% each). Cartier watches (the Tank, the Ballon Bleu) are still significant, but they’re increasingly framed as jewelry with time-telling capabilities, not the other way around. Richemont’s annual earnings report makes it obvious: the group is a jewelry company that owns some watches, not a watch company that also makes jewelry.
The Structural Shift: America Matters More
The Swiss watch industry, which has spent centuries assuming European dominance, is now confronting a reality: American buyers are carrying the market. China’s property crisis has devastated mainland demand. The Shanghai market — once the most aspirational destination for Swiss watches — is softening. Uncertainty around US tariffs adds unpredictability.
This matters because it changes how brands behave. Richemont, with heavy China exposure, is suffering. Swatch, with a portfolio that appeals to American consumers at every price point, is thriving. A Longines Conquest at CHF 1,500 finds eager buyers in Manhattan. An IWC Big Pilot at CHF 5,500 finds fewer. The brands that built their entire reputation on complexity and scarcity (the A. Lange & Söhne 1815 Perpetual Calendar, the JLC Master Ultra Thin) are watching Chinese UHNW buyers simply stop showing up at boutiques.
The US watch consumer is different — slightly less interested in haute horlogerie as status symbol, more interested in actual watchmaking quality. They’re also price-sensitive in a way Chinese consumers were not. A US buyer might pay CHF 3,000 for a Longines or Omega; they’re unlikely to pay CHF 3,000 for something slightly better-made by a smaller brand they’ve never heard of.
What This Means
For buyers, it means access. Longines, Omega, and Tissot watches are more available and more fairly priced than at any point since 2019. The brands are trying to move inventory and recapture market share. A Longines Hydroconquest that was impossible to find in 2023 is available now. An Omega Seamaster isn’t sitting on shelves, but the secondary market is softer, and boutiques are willing to negotiate.
For collectors seeking ultra-luxury (Rolex, Patek Philippe, Audemars Piguet), the market hasn’t changed — waitlists remain, and prices haven’t softened. But for the 80% of people who want a genuinely good Swiss watch that doesn’t require a second mortgage, 2026 is the best year in the last five.
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